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THE FEDERAL VOTING REFEREE PLAN AND THE
ALTERATION OF STATE VOTING STANDARDS
POSSIBLE legislation to combat voter discrimination can be considered in one
of two categories. Such legislation can either recognize that state standards are
being used to further discrimination and seek to eliminate them, alter them, or
equate them with some easily provable requirement; or it can work within the
presumption of nondiscriminatory state standards and seek to provide proce-
dural safeguards to ensure the validity of this presumption or remedies for
discriminatory actions which belie the presumption. The distinction between
these categories takes on significance from the fact that many observers believe
that the first category of legislation falls outside the scope of federal authority,1
especially in respect to state elections.2 To date Congress has not enacted legis-
lation which clearly falls in the first category and thus the scope of federal
authority in the area of voter qualifications has yet to be defined. The voting
referee plan 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1960,4 however, may raise this ques-
1. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 480, S. 2750, and S. 2979, Before the Subcomittilee ois
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess,, at
576-79, 587-89, 614-26, 633-34, 634-35, 635-39 (1962). These hearings contain letters from
constitutional- law professors of 26 law schools giving opinions on the constitutionality of
proposed legislation, which would make a sixth grade education the equivalent of any state
literacy requirement. A wide range of view was expressed, ranging from clear unconstitu-
tionality to equally clear constitutionality.
[B]arring a constitutional amendment, the power of the states to determine for
themselves what the specific nondiscriminatory qualifications should be remains ex-
clusively a state prerogative.
Id. at 588, 589. (Letter from Professor Donald J. Farage, Dickinson School of Law, to
Senator Sam J. Ervin, March 27, 1962.)
The proposed legislation presents serious and substantial questions of constitutionality.
It prescribes a drastic remedy at the expense of state power to prescribe a type of
qualification which the Supreme Court has recognized as valid.
Id. at 635, 638. (Letter from Professor Paul G. Kauper, Michigan University Law School,
to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Feb. 26, 1962.)
To me the measures seem clearly constitutional.
Id. at 627. (Letter from Professor Arthur E. Sutherland, Harvard University Law School,
to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Feb. 26, 1962.)
2. In federal elections, the right to vote emanates from the federal constitution. See
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884). Congress may restrict state action as to congressional elections
by the exercise of its powers to regulate elections under [Article I] § 4 and its more
general power under Article I, § 8, clause 18 of the Constitution "to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers."
United States v. Classic, stpra at 315. In state elections, only the right to be exempt from
discrimination comes from the federal constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 555-56 (1876) ; Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904).
3. 74 Stat. 90 (1960), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (Supp. III, 1962).
4. 74 Stat. 86 (1960), amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 837, 1074, 1509; 20 U.S.C. §§ 241, 640;
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1974(a)-1974(e), 1975(d).
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tion. Section 1971(e)5 authorizes federal district courts, or voting referees
appointed by them, to issue qualification certificates G to individuals qualified
to vote under state law who have been denied registration by the local registrar
pursuant to a pattern or practice. If the standards used by the local registrar,
however, are less stringent than the state statutory requirements, the federal
district court is directed to use the registrar's standards. Because this procedure
authorizes the certification of voters whose qualifications fall below those pro-
vided in the state statute, this legislation, designed primarily as a procedural
mechanism, appears to fall within the first category. If so, it would raise constitu-
tional problems concerning the limits of federal power in an area traditionally
governed by the states, the qualifications of the state electorate.7 However, a
closer look at the operation of section 1971(e) in the context of these two cate-
gories of federal voter legislation may obviate the necessity of deciding this
constitutional question.
In the past, discriminatory provisions of state voter qualification standards
have contributed to the lack of Negro registration in southern states.8 Among
5. 74 stat 90 (1960), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (Supp. III, 1962).
6. The only certificates so far issued under this plan are in East Carroll Parish,
Louisiana.
CERTIFICATE OF QUALIFICATION TO VOTE
It is hereby certified that
.................oo.oo........................
(Name)
... ...... ~ . .° o.. ................ ...............
(Address)
who is affiliated with the ................ Party, has been declared qualified
* by Order of The United States District Court for the Western District of




United States v. Manning, 206 F. Supp. 623, 624 (W.D. La. 1962).
7. See, e.g., Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
8. Other factors also account for this low level of Negro registration:
Apathy is part of the answer. In Atlanta... Negroes can register freely and 29 per-
cent have done so, but 44 percent of the whites have registered... Gallup polls
indicate that outside the South the voting turnout of Negroes is less than that of
whites; according to the Gallup surveys an average of 53 percent of Negroes voted
in the four national elections from 1948 to 1954, compared with a white average of
61 percent. Such apathy may stem from lack of economic, educational, or other
opportunities, but it does not constitute a denial of the right to vote.
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES CoMarassIoN ON CiVIL RIGHTS, 1959 at 52 (hereinafter cited
as 1959 Com ssiox REPOR). See also Bickel, Citil Rights The Kennedy Record, The
New Republic, December 15, 1962, p. 11.
The heart of the matter may be apathy, born of poverty, ignorance, and consequent
passive alienation... it may be-there is evidence in the North to support this
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these provisions were the infamous grandfather clauses 9 and their derivatives.1 0
When these devices were struck down by the Supreme Court, many states re-
sorted to standards which, although nondiscriminatory on their face, left much
room for unequal application. And in fact, under these current state standards,
massive discrimination continues against Negroes who wish to register to vote.11
But except where the criteria were so extremely vague as to invite discrimina-
tory application,12 the Supreme Court has consistently declined to invalidate
these standards merely because of the possibility that they might be discrimi-
natorily applied.13 The Court's position in these cases, attributable in part to
the fact that the relief generally requested was registration under the standards
rather than invalidation of them, 14 has focused attention on efforts to combat
voter discrimination through legislation.' 5
hypothesis-that those who are deprived of other rights tend not to exercise the vot-
ing right from which the others flow, even when they are free to do so.
Id. at 13.
9. No person shall be registered as an elector of this State or be allowed to vote in
any election herein, unless he be able to read and write any section of the constitution
of the State of Oklahoma; but no person who was, on January 1, 1866, or at any
time prior thereto, entitled to vote under any form of government, or who at that
time resided in some foreign nation, and no lineal descendant of such person, shall
be denied the right to register and vote because of his inability to so read and write
sections of such constitution.
Okla. Const. amendment (1910) quoted in Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 357 (1915).
See Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 377 (1915).
10. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). Although its grandfather clause was
struck down, Oklahoma sought to achieve the same result by requiring re-registratilon only
of those who had not already registered under the now invalid grandfather clause, and per-
petually disenfranchising those who did not register within a 12 day period. Under this pro-
vision, Oklahoma denied registration in 1934 to a Negro who could have registered but did
not do so during the 12 day period in 1916.
11. See 1959 Co~mmssow REPORT 42-51.
12. In Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), aff'd per curiallf, 336 U.S.
933 (1949), a standard which was too vague was invalidated because, as the judge held, it
was intended to be and was being used for the purpose of discrimination. The Boswell
Amendment to the Alabama constitution stated that the electorate would be restricted to
those "who can read and write, understand and explain any article of the constitution of
the United States in the English language" and "who are of good character and who under-
stand the duties and obligations of good citizenship under a republican- form of government,"
Ala. Const., Amendment LV (1903), amending § 181, quoted in 81 F. Supp. at 874 n.l.
13. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); Lassiter v. Northampton County
Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
14. Cases involving unsuccessful attacks on state voting procedure tend to fall in sepa-
rate categories. Williams v. Mississippi, .spra note 13, was an appeal from a murder
conviction before an all white jury so constituted because the jury list was drawn from the
list of eligible voters. Other suits sought civil damages for deprivation of constitutional
rights. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (claim for civil damages constituted cause
of action). Suits in- equity seeking a court order compelling registration were defeated by
Mr. Justice Holmes' argument that if the voter qualification provisions are valid, a plaintiff
has no case; if they are invalid, the plaintiff cannot ask a court to register him under them.
See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486-87 (1903). Thus in suits in equity the constitutionality
of the standards was not considered. A direct attack on a reasonable Maryland statute,
which requires new residents to file notice of their intent to reside in Maryland and then
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Several bills introduced in the past session of Congress, which would equate
a sixth grade education with state literacy requirements, 0 dearly fall within
the category of legislation which eliminates or alters state voting standards.
Because the power to set voting qualifications traditionally resides in the
states' 7 many observers have argued that Congress does not have the power to
alter valid state qualification requirements or to compel the registration of per-
sons who do not meet these standards.'8 Apparently for this reason several
other plans have been cast in the form of constitutional amendments. These
suggested amendments range from outlawing poll taxes '9-an amendment
which has been passed by Congress and has been submitted to the states for
ratification-to forbidding any state to set any qualifications save those relating
to age, length of residence, and legal confinement.m Except for section 1971 (e),
actually to reside in the state for one year prior to voting, led to a sweeping affirmance
of the state's power to set voter qualifications. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904). This
holding was re-affirmed in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S.
45 (1959), in which the plaintiff flatly refused to take North Carolina's literacy test. Con-
trast this history with the sustained litigation. leading up to the landmark cases of Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (white primaries); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (racially restrictive covenants) ; and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (school segregation).
15. Apart from damages to the individual, relief from a great political wrong, if done,
as alleged, by the people of a State and the State itself, must be given by them or
by the legislative and political department of the govenmment of the United States.
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (emphasis added). This holding
was limited in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), where it vas held that an action for
damages would be entertained.
16. S. 480, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., and S. 2750 and S. 2979, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
S. 2750 states a congressional finding "that literacy tests and other performance exnmina-
tions have been used extensively to effect arbitrary and unreasonable denials of the right
to vote" and provides that no one shall deny, on the basis of such requirements, the right to
vote to anyone otherwise qualified who has completed the sixth primary grade.
17. See text at note 36 infra.
18. See note 1 supra.
19. The following proposed constitutional amendment was adopted by a two-thirds vote
in the Senate on March 27, 1962, in the House on August 27, 1962, and has been submitted
to the state legislatures for ratification.
ARTIc-
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other
election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President,
or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legis-
lation.
U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2727 (1962).
Criticism has been leveled at the limited scope of this proposed amendment. Representa-
tive Lindsay of New York argued "this is using a sledgehammer, a cannon, to kill a gnat."
N.Y. Times, August 28, 1962, p. 19, col. 4. He went on, to attack "tinkering with the Con-
stitution" for such a trivial purpose.
20. In 1959 the Commission on Civil Rights proposed a twenty-third amendment.
AmcE XXIII
SECTIoN 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State or by any person for any cause except
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legislation actually passed by Congress can easily be included in the second
category, that of providing safeguards and remedies without affecting the
qualification standards provided by the states.
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 21 illustrates an attempt by Congress to provide
procedural measures which would insure the nondiscriminatory application of
state statutory voting standards. It authorized federal district courts to issue
injunctions against state voting registrars upon a showing of past discrimina-
tion or reasonable grounds to anticipate discrimination against any qualified
voter.22 The Attorney-General of the United States was empowered to institute
injunction proceedings in the name of the United States. 23 In the few times
relief was sought under this statute before it was amended, 24 several weak-
nesses became apparent.26 Local registrars, having registered all white voters
who qualified under state law, could resign when threatened with a federal court
injunction,26 and if no successor was appointed, it was unclear whether an in-
junction could issue either against a board of registrars as an entity or against
the state.2
inability to meet State age or length-of-residence requirements uniformly applied to
all persons within the State, or legal confinement at the time of registration or elec-
tion. This right to vote shall include the right to register or otherwise qualify to vote,
and to have one's vote counted.
SEmCoN 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legis-
lation.
1959 ComlissioN REPORT 144-45.
21. 71 Stat 634 (1957), 5 U.S.C. § 295-1 &42 U.S.C. §§ 1975, 1975(a)-(e), and amend-
ing28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1861 &42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1958).
22. 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (c) (1958) authorizes preventive relief when-
ever "any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to believe that any person
is about to engage in any act or practice which would deprive any other person' of the right
to vote if qualified.
23. Ibid.
24. United States v. Raines, 172 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ga. 1959) ; United States v. Mc-
Elveen, 177 F. Supp. 355 (E.D. La. 1959) ; United States v. Alabama, 171 F. Supp. 720
(M.D. Ala. 1959).
25. At least one observer predicted the problems which arose:
Moreover, the device of resignation may well turn out to be an effective answer to
the Attorney General's requests for injunctions. I doubt seriously that a federal court
can require a man to remain in office. I also doubt that many registrars would liesi-
tate to give up their jobs if that would maintain the status quo by barring effective
injunctive relief.
Horsky, The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Right to Vote, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 549, 553
(1959).
26. United States v. Alabama, 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala. 1959).
27. Id. at 729. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) was held to only contemplate discrimination by
"persons." See note 22 supra. This holding was affirmed in the Court of Appeals. United
States v. Alabama, 267 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1959). The case was remanded following passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86 (1960), which amended § 1971(c) to allow such
suits to be brought against the state. United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960).
Only after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 has it been determined that § 1971(c)
allows a district court judge to order a local registrar to register specified voters. Alabama
v. United States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 83 Sup. Ct. 145 (1962).
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These difficulties and other problems inherent in attempting to end discrimi-
nation through the enforced cooperation of state officials 8 led Congress to
consider two basic remedies. Under the Federal registrar plan,20 which would
apply to only federal elections, the Commission on Civil Rights, upon the re-
ceipt of nine or more affidavits from qualified voters of one voting unit who had
been denied registration, would determine whether a pattern of discrimination
existed. The Commission would certify its finding of such a pattern to the
President, who at his discretion could appoint a temporary or permanent fed-
eral registrar for the voting unit. This registrar would apply state statutory
standards and in general would act as much as possible like an ideal state
registrar; that is, a state registrar who would not discriminate in applying state
voting standards. Prior to elections he would send a list of all persons registered
by him to the appropriate election officials, who under pain of fine or imprison-
ment would have to allow those so registered to vote. Since under this plan the
federal registrar would be directed to apply the voting qualifications provided in
state statutes, this proposal would not affect state voting standards and thus
would not raise the constitutional problems inherent in that category of legis-
lation.
But this proposal was not enacted. Congress instead chose the voting referee
plan,30 which became Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1960. This act applies
to both state and federal elections. The procedure provided in the act does not
come into effect until after an injunction prohibiting the state registrar from
discriminating has been issued pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1957. After
the issuance of this injunction and after a court finding of a "pattern or practice"
of discrimination in a particular district, it allows a district court judge or a
referee appointed by him to issue a certificate stating that the voter has been
declared qualified to vote.31 This qualification certificate is granted to any
28. For several examples of discriminatory tactics see United States v. Alabama, 192
F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. 1961); United States v. Raines, 189 F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ga.
1960). See also Gomillion, Cizil Democracy and the Problems of Registration and Voting
of Negroes in the South, 18 LAw. Guu.n REv. 149, 150 (1958).
29. See S. 2684, S. 2719, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., and S. 2783, S. 2814, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1960). The federal registrar plan was recommended by the Commission on Civil
Rights. See 1959 ComsnsISoN REPoRT 141-42.
30. 74 Stat. 90 (1960), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (Supp. III, 1962).
31. Such a certificate has been issued in United States v. Manning, 206 F. Supp. 623
(W.D. La. 1962). No Negro has been allowed to vote in East Carroll Parish, Louisiana.
since 1922. In July, 1962, the federal district court for the Vestern District of Louisiana,
applying the federal voting referee plan, ordered the issuance of certificates declaring cer-
tain Negroes qualified to vote. The state of Louisiana sought to enjoin this action, arguing
that the heart of the plan, providing that "the court ... shall issue to each applicant so
declared qualified a certificate... . was unconstitutional. The court rejected the state's
arguments, holding that the provision is not an improper delegation of executive power to
the judiciary, that issuance of registration certificates is a "case or controversy" within
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution, and that the act does not invade rights reserved to the
states under the tenth amendment. The plan as a whole has been attacked elsewhere with
a plethora of constitutional objections. Among the more significant objections are 1) The
statute leaves no discretion in a court of equity; and 2) The finding of a pattern of discrim-
19631
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member of the race discriminated against who is found qualified to vote "under
state law" and who, subsequent to the court's order forbidding discrimination,
has either been refused the chance to register or has been found not qualified
to vote by the state registrar. The statute further provides that refusal of elec-
tion officials to allow a certificate holder to vote constitutes contempt of court.
Although the act directs the federal court or referee to issue a certificate only
to applicants found "qualified under State law to vote," section 1971(e) ex-
pressly provides its own definition of this phrase:
[T]he words "qualified under State law" shall mean qualified according
to the laws, customs, or usages of the State, and shall not, in any event,
imply qualifications more stringent than those used by the persons found
... [to have discriminated] ... in qualifying persons other than those of
the race or color against which the pattern or practice of discrimination
was found to exist.8 2
Assuming state law provides an ascertainable qualification standard,83 the
state registrar authorized to enforce the state registration statute may discrim-
ination is a supplemental finding to the case at bar and hence a non-judicial function. See
United States v. Raines, 203 F. Supp. 147 (M.D. Ga. 1961).
The current administration's anticipated 1963 civil rights bill may be subject to attack
on a similar basis. See The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 18, 1963, p. 1, col. 1.
A key provision, of the Kennedy voting bill would require a judge to name a Federal
registrar immediately after the Government certified that a significant percentage of
voting-age Negroes in any community had been denied the right to vote. This would
eliminate the need for a court finding of systematic discrimination and presumably
would remove the judge's discretion in the matter; he would have to appoint a Fed-
eral registrar or act in that role himself, merely on the Government's application,
Ibid.
Assuming that the bill requires a federal judge, who has no discretion in the matter, to
appoint a registrar merely upon certification of an unchallengeable factual determination
made by the executive branch of the government, it might well be unconstitutional. This
appears to be a clear case of a legislative attempt to impose a nonjudicial function upon the
judiciary. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (1 Dall.) 408 (1792).
The objective of the administration's bill is to speed up the process of the federal referee
plan, particularly in the appointment of the federal voting official. Such an objective could
be accomplished by a plan similar to the federal registrar plan. See note 29 supra and ac-
companying text. This plan works entirely through the executive branch and would not be
subject to the aforementioned constitutional attack.
Moreover, aside from the question of improper delegation, this proposal !it eliminating
the need for a finding of systematic discrimination before the appointment of a federal
referee raises constitutional questions identical with those posed by the federal voting ref-
eree plan. This assumes, of course, that the proposed act, like the federal voting referee
plan, requires the referee to apply a standard different from state statutory law. The ab-
sence of a finding of systematic discriminatory application of these statutory standards
would render the rationale proposed in this Note for holding the federal referee plan conu
stitutional inapplicable. Thus, this proposed act may require a constitutional decision on
whether Congress can modify state voting standards that have not been proven to be in-
valid. See text at notes 55-70 infra.
32. 74 Stat. 92 (1960), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (Supp. III, 1962) (emphasis added).
33. An unascertainable standard would be invalid. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp, 872
(S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiant, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
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inate in its use by either applying a higher standard to Negro applicants than
that provided in the state statute or a lower standard to white applicants, or
by a combination of both methods. In any case in which the state registrar
has applied a lower standard to whites than the state statute requires, the
direction of section 1971 (e) that the court apply the registrar's standard will
result in requiring a federal judge or referee to issue qualification certificates
declaring the persons named qualified to vote when, in fact, the applicants were
qualified by means of a lower standard than the state statute requires.?4 To the
extent that section 1971(e) alters the state statutory standard, it ceases to be
wholly within that category of legislation which merely provides procedural
safeguards against discrimination and, for the first time, raises the constitutional
problems common to the category of legislation that would affect state qualifica-
tion standards.
The reasoning underlying the constitutional objections to this category of
legislation has not been fully articulated,35 but would seem to be based on the
long-accepted proposition that the right to vote, at least in state elections, em-
anates from the states.38 Although Congress may have some power to affect
voting qualifications in federal elections,3 7 as to state elections only the right to be
exempt from discrimination comes from the federal Constitution.as The four-
teenth amendment empowers Congress to pass appropriate legislation to prevent
denial of equal protection of the laws; the fifteenth amendment empowers
Congress to pass appropriate legislation to ensure that the right to vote shall not
be denied on account of race. Therefore, any attempt by Congress to alter state
voting standards for state elections is valid only if it can be classified as "appro-
priate legislation" under the fourteenth or the fifteenth amendment In section
1971 (e), the voting standard adopted indicates that the purpose of Congress was
34. The state's standard would be the state qualification statute as applied by registrars
throughout the state. The local registrar's standard would be the standards he actually
demands of white applicants. For factors which would be relevant in determining these
standards see United States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La. 1960) (Negroes purged
from voting lists for defects in application form present in 501 of the white voters' applica-
tions) ; United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (MLD. Ala. 1961) (court named certain
white voters who had received assistance filling out application forms) ; Byrd v. Brice, 104
F. Supp. 442 (W.D. La. 1952) (extremely low standard applied to white applicants).
35. But see note 1 stpra.
36. E.g., McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) ; Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S.
328, 335 (1900) ; Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937). But cf. United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-15 (1941) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1884),
which hold that although the federal constitution adopts state qualifications for congressional
electors, the right to vote in federal elections comes from the federal constitution.
37. The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Represen-
tatives, shall be prescribed in, each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I § 4. See also note 36 supra. But see Comment, Congressional Authority
to Restrict the Use of Literacy Tests, 50 CALiF. L. REv. 265, 270-71 (1962).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-56 (1876) ; Pope v. Wil-
liams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904).
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to ensure the registration of Negro voters on an equal basis with white voters,
rather than the more limited objective of registering all Negro voters qualified
under a reasonable interpretation of state law.39 In determining whether this is
"appropriate" legislation under the fourteenth or the fifteenth amendments, 40
the means chosen-the application in certain instances of a standard lower than
the state standard-must be examined in the context of an attempt to achieve
a clearly constitutional end.
The interpretation in Ex parte Virginia 41 of the power of Congress to pass
"appropriate legislation" under the fourteenth and the fifteenth amendments--
that "whatever legislation is... adapted to carry out the objects the Amend-
ments have in view... if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of con-
gressional power"4 2 -makes it clear that the "appropriate legislation" clause
in these amendments is to be construed in the same manner as the "necessary
and proper" clause.48 In McCulloch v. Maryland,44 the Supreme Court, inter-
preting the necessary and proper clause broadly, established the principle that
if the end is constitutional, means "which are plainly adapted to that end"40
and "which are not prohibited"40 will generally be upheld. The interests alleged
to be infringed upon by the congressional exercise of power in that case were
those of federalism. And generally in other cases where the only competing in-
terests were alleged interferences with the power of the states, the Court has
afforded a large area of discretion to Congress to choose the means of achieving
a constitutional end.
47
39. The testimony of then Attorney-General Rogers, who was urging the passage of
the federal referee plan, indicates otherwise.
I am sure the district judge will lean over backwards to be sure that anybody who
is certified and qualified to vote will be fully qualified under state law.
Hearings on S. 435, S. 456, S. 499, S. 810, S. 957, S. 958, S. 959, S. 960, S. 1084, S. 1199,
S. 1277, S. 1848, S. 1998, S. 2001, S. 2202, S. 2003, and S. 2041, Before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess,, pt.
5, at 55 (1959).
This seems contrary to the clear mandate of the act. See text at note 32 supra. If Con-
gress merely wished to register qualified voters under state law, as opposed to under the
local standard, the federal refree plan would have incorporated the state standard, as indeed
the federal registrar plan did. See text at note 29 supra.
40. See Heyman, Federal Remedies for Voteless Negroes, 48 CAUF. L, REV. 190, 206
(1960), for a short assertion, of the constitutionality of § 1971 (e) under the fifteenth amend-
ment.
41. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
42. Id. at 345-46.
43. The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
partment or Officer, thereof.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
44. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
45. Id. at 421.
46. Ibid.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 346 (1878) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110
U.S. 651, 658 (1884).
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However, the recent decision in Kinsella v. United Statcs ex rcl. Singleton 48
may indicate a willingness on the part of the Court to scrutinize the necessity
and propriety of congressional means. In that case, one of a series of cases in-
volving the limits of military court-martial jurisdiction,40 the Court struck down
a congressional attempt to have civilian dependents of military personnel tried
by court martial. The government argued that jurisdiction should be upheld as
a necessary and proper incident of its constitutional power to "make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.'a The court
refused to so read the necessary and proper clause:
If the exercise of the power is valid it is because it is granted in Clause 14,
not because of the Necessary and Proper Clause. The latter clause is not
itself a grant of power, but a caveat that the Congress possesses all the
means necessary to carry out the specifically granted "foregoing" powers
of section 8 "and all other powers vested by this Constitution....",1
A contrary holding here would have deprived civilian dependents of military
personnel of rights secured by the federal Constitution such as the right to a
jury trial.
The legislation struck down in Kinsella may be distinguished from section
19 7 1 (e), since that legislation affected other rights afforded by the federal Con-
stitution. The only interests affected by section 1971 (e) are those of federal-
ism. But if Kinsella is not limited to situations where the exercise of power
under the necessary and proper clause conflicts with other constitutional pro-
visions, then the approach of the Court in that case to the necessary and proper
clause has a broader applicability. Under that approach, the availability of an-
other method, which would not affect state voting standards, of achieving the
same end contemplated by section 1971 (e)-the registration of Negro voters
on an equal basis with white voters-would seem to be a significant factor in
determining whether section 1971(e) is an "appropriate" means of achieving
this end.
Such a method could be derived from current provisions of section 1971
with some minor additions: local registrars could be enjoined from register-
ing white voters who fail to meet the state statutory standard, 2 and the federal
referee plan could then incorporate the same statutory standard with no result-
ing inequality against Negro applicants. In the event of indeterminate or long-
48. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
49. United States ex reL. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) ; Kinsella v. Kruegar,
351 U.S. 470 (1956) ; Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956) ; Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S.
278 (1960) ; McElroy v. United States ex reL. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
50. Kinsella v. United States ex re. Singleton, 361 U.S. at 237.
51. 361 U.S. at 247. gee also United States ex reL. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955),
which holds that the determination of the scope of legislative power to authorize trial by
court-martial calls for "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." Id. at 23
(quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821)).
52. The device of resignation by the state registrar, see notes 25-26 mipra, would not
be effective since the registrar presumably wants to register all possible white voters.
Resignation would prevent registration of white voters; Negro applicants could be registered
by the district court.
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term state registration periods, unqualified white voters already registered could
be removed by court orders compelling re-examination of all registered voters
within a reasonable stated time; such orders would be justified by the equal
protection clause. This plan would in no way alter state voter qualifications;
indeed, it would insure strict compliance with the state statutory standard.
Given the possibility of a narrow construction of "appropriate" as that term
is used in the fourteenth and the fifteenth amendments, and the widespread
belief that federal legislation establishing qualifications for voters is beyond the
power of Congress, 53 the existence of this purely procedural means of reach-
ing the same end casts doubt upon the validity, under the fourteenth or the
fifteenth amendment, of this congressional effort to combat voter discrimina-
tion. These doubts warrant a closer examination into what Congress has actual-
ly done in directing the federal courts to certify voters who meet the standard
actually applied by the state registrar to the preferred group. If this legislation
does not in fact alter valid state requirements, it would fall into the category
of legislation providing procedural safeguards against voter discrimination. Such
a finding would obviate the necessity of an examination of the limits of con-
gressional power directly to affect state voting standards, an examination which
would be exceedingly important in regard to proposed legislation like the sixth
grade literacy bills. The federal referee plan, primarily a procedural remedy,
may not present a case properly framed or properly timed for deciding an issue
which has such far reaching implications in our federal system. Legislation such
as the literacy bill would seem to better and more directly pose the question of
Congress' power in this area than the federal referee plan. Indeed, a decision
on this question in relation to section 1971 (e) might simply evoke "premature
echoes" that would prove troublesome in considering later, more difficult
cases. Thus, even if section 1971 (e) can be sustained as an appropriate means
to achieve the ends of the fourteenth and the fifteenth amendments, another
avenue of decision, which would permit the Court to avoid having to define the
limits of congressional power to establish federal voting qualifications or to
change state ones, would seem advisable. 5
The problem of justifying the alteration of state standards would disappear
if the registrar's standard could be considered determinative of state law. It is
established that a state standard, to be valid, must be ascertainable ;60 thus,
when a state registrar applies a lower standard than that provided in a reason-
ably definite state statute, he may be acting under color of state law, but he is
at the same time acting in violation of such law. To equate his illegal activity
53. See note 1 supra.
54. Pollak, The Supreme Court and the States: Reflections 8n Boynton v. Virginta, 49
CAlIF. L. REv. 15,40 (1961).
55. Judicial authority to select the most apt of several possible avenues of decision is a
sensitive and a powerful weapon. Utilized with sophistication, it complements the
Supreme Court's broad discretion. as to which cases the Court will entertain, and in
what sequence.
Id. at 17.
56. See note 12 supra.
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with state law would require an application of the "under color of state law"
doctrine-which attributes to the state actions of its officials 57-in a setting
quite different from its original context. The doctrine has traditionally been
used to provide a federal remedy for one whose constitutional rights have been
violated by the unlawful actions of a state official;5s it should not be used,
against a proper standard asserted by the state, as a conclusive definition of
what constitutes state law. To do so would allow the unlawful actions of a state
official to alter or modify state law duly promulgated by state legislatures and
interpreted by its courts for purposes other than relief in an individual case.
The state's argument that its registrar's actions does not constitute state law
is strengthened where it provides a remedy for the improper application of its
registration statute by the local registrar. In Louisiana, for example, any two
registered voters can challenge the qualifications of any other registered voter.59
Thus the inclusion of the registrar's standard in the federal referee plan cannot
be justified by the assumption that the registrar's standard determines the law-
ful state standard. Since the standard Congress has incorporated in the federal
referee plan is not the lawful state standard, section 1971 (e) would still appear
to alter state law.
But this conclusion rests upon the proposition that there is a valid state stat-
ute providing standards for the registration of voters. This proposition in turn
assumes that the consistent discriminatory application of a voting statute by
a local registrar does not in any way affect the validity of the statute. Voter
registration statutes have been held to be constitutionally infirm only when an
invidious discriminatory purpose is apparent on the face of the statute, as ex-
emplified by the grandfather clauses,60 or when the criteria provided are so
vague as to confer unfettered discretion on a state official, such as a require-
ment that only persons of good character can vote.(" Constitutional guarantees
against discrimination wholly invalidate such statutes. Where a state statutory
requirement is not subject to invalidation on those grounds, challenges to the
statute based upon a particular discriminatory application would result in a
holding that the action taken under the statute is unconstitutional. The statute
itself, however, would remain unaffected by such a holding. But the Supreme
Court's decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (;2 indicates that a challenge to official
action based upon a history of discriminatory application taken under an ap-
parently nondiscriminatory statute may have further reaching effects than a
mere invalidation of the official's action in a particular case. In that case, a San
Francisco ordinance required the licensing of all laundries operated in wooden
57. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1960).
58. Ibid.
59. LA. rv. STAT. fit. 18, § 245 (1952) allows two registered voters, "after reasonable
investigation and on information and belief certain persons are illegally registered," to
challenge by written affidavit such persons' registration.
60. See note 9 supra.
61. See note 12 mipra.
62. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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buildings. Licenses were systematically granted to all but Chinese laundrymen.
Yick Wo was convicted of violating the ordinance by operating without a
license and was sent to jail for nonpayment of the fine. The Supreme Court, in
directing his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus, declared:
In the present cases, we are not obliged to reason from the probable to the
actual, and pass upon the validity of the ordinances complained of, as tried
merely by the opportunities which their terms afford, of unequal and un-
just discrimination in their administration. For the cases present the or-
dinances in actual operation, and the facts shown establish an administra-
tion directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons as to war-
rant and require the conclusion, that, whatever may have been the intent
of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities
charged with their administration, and thus representing the State itself,
with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial
by the state of that equal protection of the laws which is secured to the
petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet,
if it is applied and administered by the public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimi-
nations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights,
the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitu-
tion.63
The application of the equal protection clause in the Yick Wo case resulted
in the condemnation of discriminatory executive action taken under an ordinance
nondiscriminatory on its face. 4 This discrimination occurred in the issuance of
licenses; Yick Wo was sent to jail for operating without a license. In order to
release him from jail, the Supreme Court had to conclude that the requirement
that Yick Wo have a license to operate was invalid because of the pattern of
discriminatory issuance of licenses which had been demonstrated. The ordinance
63. Id. at 373-74.
64. The decision in the Yick Wo case may be explained as a necessary consequence of
the vagueness of the ordinance.
It lays down no rules by which its impartial execution can be secured or partiality
and oppression prevented.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. at 372-73 (1886), quoting City of Baltimore v. Radecke,
49 Md. 217, 230 (1878) (emphasis in original).
The decision can be explained as a consequence of the unconstitutional motive of the
city of San Francisco in passing the ordinances.
The seem intended to confer ... a naked and arbitrary power to give or withhold
consent ....
118 U.S. at 366 (emphasis added).
The case may be considered the result of the extensive discretion given the supervisors,
The power given to them . . . is granted to their mere will. It is purely arbitrary,
and acknowledges neither guidance nor restraint.
Id. at 366-67.
The general theory of the Yick Wo case is that constitutional guarantees will invalidate
discriminatory action. taken under an otherwise valid and non-discriminatory law. See text
at note 63 supra. See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944) ; Lassiter v. North-
ampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959).
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requiring a license to operate was not declared unconstitutional ;5 nor %as the
question of whether the ordinance could be used to prevent other persons from
operating laundries in wooden buildings decided. Nevertheless the effects of the
Court's decision is that the ordinance cannot be constitutionally enforced against
Yick Wo or any other person who was discriminated against in the issuance of
licenses. For any proceeding to impose sanctions upon such persons for operat-
ing without licenses would be invalidated because of the pattern of discrimina-
tory issuance that was demonstrated in Yick Wo. This leads to the conclusion
that the validity of this ordinance cannot be asserted in any judicial proceeding
until applied in a manner not prohibited by the fourteenth amendment-until,
in effect, it is purged of its unconstitutionality. In the Yick Wo case, this could
only be accomplished by a nondiscriminatory relicensing of all wooden laundries,
since allowing those licensed under the discriminatory procedure to remain
licensed would perpetuate the past discriminatory executive action which vas
the basis for the result in Yick Wo. 0 Thus, although the ordinance is not com-
pletely invalidated because of the manner of its enforcement, it is constitution-
ally infirm to the extent that its enforcement violates the federal constitution
until the state revokes all outstanding licenses and proceeds to issue them im-
partially.
This experience under Yick Wo demonstrates that a pattern of discrimina-
tory executive action taken under a nondiscriminatory statute may render re-
quirements of that statute constitutionally invalid.67 In any proceeding under
section 1971 (e) evidence of systematic discrimination is necessarily present, as
that provision does not go into effect until a federal district court has made a
65. See Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine I the Supreme Court, 109 U.PA. L.
REv. 67, 111-14 (1960), for an analysis of the Yick Wo case in terms of vagueness. That
commentator considered the effect of the decision on the San Francisco ordinance.
[lit would have been competent for the San Francisco supervisors to continue en-
forcement of its wooden laundry regulation after Yich Wo provided that they manage
to avoid any (judicially provable) discrimination.
109 U. PA. L. REv. at 113.
66. Such a result would be comparable to the denial of equal protection condemned in
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). See note 10 supra.
67. The Yick Wo doctrine has not been relied upon, in prior cases involving discrimina-
tion in registration. In general an attack on the state standard was incidental as the parties
asked for a court order compelling registration or civil damages for a denial of constitutional
rights. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). Some litigants did not prove actual
discrimination. In one case the Supreme Court specifically refused to apply the Yich Wo
doctrine to state standards, stating that it was
not applicable to the constitution of Mississippi and its statutes. They do not or their
face discriminate between the races, and it has not been shown that their actual
administration was evil, only that evil was possible under them.
Williams v. Mfississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898). But see Byrd v. Brice, 104 F. Supp. 442
(W.D. La. 1952), aff'd, 201 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1953). A district court judge, relying in part
upon the Yick Wo case, enjoined a registrar from discriminating against Negro applicants.
There were 9,000 registered white voters and no registered colored voters.
See also note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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finding that a deprivation of voting rights has occurred and that this depriva-
tion was pursuant to a "pattern or practice" of discrimination. In Yick Wo the
requirement rendered invalid because of systematic discrimination was the
necessity of a license to operate. Where the local registrar applies a lower
standard to white applicants than the state registration statute provides, the
requirements rendered invalid would be those provisions of the statute that
have not been applied as written to the preferred group. So long as members
of the preferred group remain registered to vote, after being registered in ac-
cordance with the lower standard, the application of these statutory require-
ments to Negro applicants would clearly constitute a denial of equal protection
of the law. These provisions would continue to be unenforceable until, in effect,
they are purged of their unconstitutionality. As in the Yick Wo case, this could
only be achieved by revoking the registration of those applicants who, by not
being required to fulfill these statutory standards, were qualified under a dis-
criminatory procedure. Because these provisions of the state voting registration
statute are unenforceable when the local registrar has systematically used a
lower standard for white applicants, Congress can hardly be said to have altered
state law in this situation by directing the federal courts not to use the statu-
tory standard in registering Negro applicants who have been discriminated
against.
Although Congress has not altered a state standard in qualifying applicants
by means of a lower standard when the state statutory provisions are in fact
unenforceable, the source of congressional power to set any standard for voter
qualification must be examined. Once it is recognized that the state statutory
standards are, in effect, invalid because of their discriminatory application, the
congressional requirement that the district court qualify all Negro applicants
who are eligible to vote under the local registrar's standard is clearly an "ap-
propriate" remedy under the fourteenth and the fifteenth amendments. The
requirements of the state registration statute which have not been discrimina-
torily applied remain valid and thus constitute an enforceable state standard
which is less stringent than the local registrar's, since it does not include any
of the requirements the registrar has misapplied. Congress could probably have
provided for the registration of all Negro applicants who fulfill only those state
statutory requirements that remain enforceable. But this would seem unfair to
white applicants, who have no access to the federal referee plan, which only
qualifies members of the group discriminated against.0 8 On the other hand, con-
gressional use of any standard higher than that applied by the local registrar to
white applicants would perpetuate the past discrimination, since all white voters
already qualified in relation to the lower standard would remain registered.
Thus, in the absence of an enforceable state standard higher than that used by
the local registrar, Congress' use of the registrar's standard would seem to be
the most "appropriate" means to remedy the denial of equal protection forbid-
68. 74 Stat. 90 (1960), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (e) (Supp. II, 1962) provides that only a
person of the "race or color" discriminated against is entitled to an order declaring hint
qualified to vote.
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den by the fourteenth amendment and the denial of the right to vote on account
of race condemned by the fifteenth amendment.
Moreover, the appropriateness of section 1971(e) is further demonstrated
by the fact that Congress has in no way deprived the states of the power to re-
establish the validity of those standards rendered unenforceable and to require
that all voters, including those certified under the federal referee plan, meet
their requirements so long as those requirements are impartially applied. Con-
gress provided that a federal order of qualification
shall be effective as to any election held within the longest period for which
such applicant could have been registered or otherwise qualified under
State law at which the applicant's qualifications would under State law
entitle him to vote.69
This indicates that the state, by revoking all registrations and requiring com-
plete re-registration of all voters, could terminate the federal qualification
orders. It could then proceed to register Negro as well as white voters, in ac-
cordance with standards established by the state legislature and without any
federal interference. Lack of discrimination in the new registration procedure
would render the federal referee plan totally inoperative.70
The recent case of United States v. Penton 71 graphically illustrates the desir-
ability of applying the rationale of Yick Wo to state voting requirements which
have been applied in a discriminatory manner. In this case Judge Johnson, after
hearing the oral testimony of over 175 witnesses and after examining approxi-
mately 13,000 exhibits, concluded that the registrars of Montgomery County,
Alabama, had been using a statutory requirement-that a registration question-
naire be filled out "in the presence of the board without assistance"7 - in a dis-
criminatory manner.73 For the period from January 1, 1956 through June 16,
1961, an average of 75.4 per cent of Negro applicants were rejected compared
to an average rejection of 3.4 per cent of the white applicants.
Of these rejected Negroes, 6 had master's degrees; 152 had four years of
college training, and 222 had some college education. This group of rejected
Negroes included 108 Negro public school teachers. 74
The court found that for white applicants the questionnaire had been used
"merely as a method to obtain substantive information concerning the appli-
cants' qualifications." 75 However, for Negro applicants it was used, in addition,
69. Ibid.
70. The federal referee plan provides that the court, after a finding of a pattern or
practice of discrimination, shall continue to entertain applicants for qualification orders
for one year and thereafter until the court subsequently finds that such pattern or
practice has ceased.
bid.
71. Civil Action No. 1741-N (M.D. Ala. 1962).
72. 17 Ala. Stat. § 31 (1940).
73. See Marshall, Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 27 LAw & CoNTrrap.
PRoB. 455, 462-63 (1962).
74. United States v. Penton, Civil Action No. 1741-N (M.D. Ala. 1962) at p. 3.
75. Id. at 5.
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"as a tricky examination or test."76 Most white applicants were given assist-
ance with the questionnaire if they requested it. Technical errors in filling out
the questionnaire were disregarded if the applicant was white, but became the
basis for rejection if the applicant was a Negro. A question asking for length
of residence in the state, county and precinct was regularly filled in for white
voters from oral information; Negroes were given no assistance. Negroes who
were not informed that they must sign a printed oath were rejected for not do-
ing so. Judge Johnson made detailed findings as to the standard applied by the
local registrar to white applicants. In addition to ordering the registration of
several hundred named Negroes found qualified in relation to this standard
during the course of the trial,77 he declared
It is further oRDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that said defendants are en-
joined from using ... different and more stringent qualification require-
ments for registration in Montgomery County, Alabama, than (those)
used by the Board of Registrars of Montgomery County since at least
January 1, 1956.78
He also enjoined the registrars from rejecting any applicant for failure to fill
out the residence question correctly, for failure to sign the oath unless the ap-
plicant refuses, or for "technical or inconsequential errors or omissions." The
court stated that the determination of the local registrars' actual standard
will facilitate registration under the federal referee provisions of the Civil
Rights Act if future conduct by the defendants makes this course neces-
sary.79
If the Yick Wo doctrine is applied to the state statutory standard in this case,
the judge's order is viewed merely as an injunction forbidding enforcement of
state requirements which have been rendered invalid because of their past dis-
criminatory application. The order prevents future denials of equal protection
by requiring that Negro applicants be judged by the same standards used in
qualifying those persons already registered. If, despite the proven discrimination
in application, and despite the fact that those registered under this discrimina-
tory procedure remain registered, the state standard remains valid, judge John-
son's decree must be viewed as a federal court order compelling a state official
to continue to violate state law.
Although the Penton case arises under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and
1960, the particular remedy granted in that case-the injunction requiring the
state registrar to apply the lower standard to Negroes-is not explicitly au-
thorized by either of these acts.80 But this would not seem to be a bar to the
76. Ibid.
77. See Alabama v. United States, 304 F2d 583(5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 83 Sup. Ct.
145 (1962). A district court order compelling the state registrar to register named Negro
applicants was upheld.
78. United States v. Penton, Civil Action No. 1741-N (M.D. Ala. 1962), Decree, p. 2.
79. United States v. Penton, supra note 78, at 10.
80. 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (Supp. III, 1962) authorizes the Attor-
ney General of the United States, upon proof of past discrimination or a showing of reason.
able grounds for future discrimination, to institute a proper proceeding for
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court's action in this case. For the rationale of the Yick Wo case is a judicial
doctrine which has long been available to prevent application of constitutionally
infirm state statutes to those discriminated against The availability of this
traditional judicial doctrine indicates that congressional legislation was not a
prerequisite to judicial action; the presumed bar to such action, the fact that a
state standard was nondiscriminatory on its face, was illusory. Willingness to
invalidate state standards upon proof of a pattern of discriminatory executive
action taken under them would allow the judiciary to meet future and more
subtle attempts to discriminate, lessening dependence on Congress for effective
remedies. The Supreme Court has stated, through Mir. Justice Frankfurter, that
constitutional prohibitions against voter discrimination nullify sophisticated as
well as obvious methods of discrimination.81 The question of whether section
1971 (e) alters state voting standards, or whether it in reality falls in the cate-
gory of purely procedural legislation, affords an opportunity for the application
of the Yick Wo doctrine to these standards. This opportunity should indicate
how sophisticated the federal judiciary is prepared to be in the area of voter
discrimination.
preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or other order.
Section 1971(d) confers jurisdiction upon United States district courts to entertain such
proceedings.
81. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
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